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OVERBOOKING OF AIRLINE RESERVATIONS IN
VIEW OF "NADER v. ALLEGHENY AIRLINES, INC.":
THE OPENING OF PANDORA'S BOX
STANLEY LEE TICE*

I. INTRODUCTION

Air travelers are becoming increasingly aware of airline overbooking of reservations.1 This comment examines the carrier's practice of overbooking and its attendant problems. The current reservations system gives consumers maximum flexibility in the making,
changing, and honoring of airline reservations.! This freedom has
created the problem of no-shows, reservation holders who fail
either to honor or cancel their reservations. Overbooking attempts
to neutralize the no-shows by accepting a surplus of reservations
* B.A., University of Texas; J.D. to be awarded by the University of Houston
Law School in Aug., 1977. Mr. Tice is presently employed as a legal assistant
with Texas International Airlines (TI). The author wishes to thank Sam Coats,
Esq., General Counsel for TI, and John Williams, Associate General Counsel for
TI, for both technical and practical insight.
'The Civil Aeronautics Board defines overbooking as follows: "'Deliberate
overbooking' means the practice of knowingly confirming reserved space for
a greater number of passengers that can be carried in the specific class of service
on the flight and date for which confirmation is given." 14 C.F.R. § 221.4
(1977), 41 Fed. Reg. 40,500. The Civil Aeronautics Board has noted an increase
in complaints during 1975 relating to oversales, which constituted 6.7% of the
11,916 complaints received by the Board's complaints division. The comparable
percentages for overbooking complaints for previous years are as follows: 7.5%
in 1974; 6.6% in 1973; 9.2% in 1972. The Board stated that "consumer dissatisfaction with the existing overbooking practices and regulation thereof is
further evidenced by several lawsuits which have recently been instituted against
carriers by oversold passengers." Civil Aeronautics Board Reexamination of the
Board's Policies Concerning Deliberate Overbooking and Oversales, EDR-296
in 41 Fed. Reg. 16,478-79 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as CAB EDR-296].
2 See Civil Aeronautics Board Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CAB Docket
No. 16563, EDR-109 in 32 Fed. Reg. 459 (1967); Civil Aeronautics Board
Emergency Reservations Practices Investigation, CAB Docket No. 26253 in 39
Fed. Reg. 823 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as CAB ERPI]; Brief for the Air
Transport Association of America as Amicus Curiae, Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Brief for the ATA].
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to replace the vacancies created by the flexible reservation system."
If more reservation holders show up for their desired flight than
are anticipated, the carrier must deny boarding to some of the
ticket holders despite their reservations. This is referred to as
bumping, and bumping obviously irritates and inconveniences the
generally unsuspecting reservation holder."
The consumer's desire to retain a flexible reservation system
conflicts directly with the carrier's need to assure sufficient passengers to fill the airplane's seating capacity. The airlines cannot
maintain a fluid system without imposing penalties, forfeitures, or
subsidies so that the carriers may operate profitably. Carriers have
been able to overbook reservations without fear of retaliation from
bumped passengers unless the carrier discriminated against that
passenger.' The United States Supreme Court's holding in Nader
v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. has jeopardized the practice of overbooking because the carriers are not immunized from commonlaw claims arising from overbooking practices.' The Nader case
has created difficulties due to the coexistence of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and judicial remedies available to the
bumped reservation holders.
Little authority currently exists for this developing area of law
due to the inadequate regulation by the CAB and to public unfamiliarity with the remedies available to the bumped passenger.
Section II of this comment describes the concept of overbooking,
the methods used to determine the optimum number of reservations to accept, and the need to retain overbooking. Section III
reviews the function of the CAB and current CAB regulations
applicable to overbooking. Section IV reviews the Nader ruling
and the problems created by the issues whose disposition was
'Brief for the ATA, supra note 2. For a complete study on the no-show
problem and consequential bumping due to overbooking, see CAB ERPI, supra
note 2; see generally 96 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH. 30 (Feb. 14, 1972); 77 Av.
WEEK & SPACE TECH. 30 (Oct. 1, 1962); 76 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH. 45 (Jan.
15, 1962); 65 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH. 38 (July 9, 1956).
" Comment, Federal Preemption of State Law: The Example of Overbooking
in the Airline Industry, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1200, 1202, 1205 (1976). However,
"the reservations system is not one where the airlines indiscriminately sell more

seats than are available on all flights and then hope for the best." Brief for the
ATA, supra note 2, at 10.

' See Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
"Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
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omitted in the Supreme Court's decision. Section V analyzes the
problems created by Nader in light of the scant precedent pertaining to overbooking. Section VI examines the soundness of the
CAB's response to the problems caused by the Nader case. Finally,
Section VII compares previous solutions to the problem with a
proposed solution that could circumvent the overbooking dilemma
and eliminate these problems.
II.

OVERBOOKING PRACTICES: THE NATURE OF THE DILEMMA

A. Concept Of Overbooking
Overbooking dates back to the 1940's when airlines encountered
the inevitable occurrence of no-shows, cancelled and changed
reservations." Overbooking was originated to allow the carrier to
retain the flexible reservations system by re-selling vacated seats,
seats that would have remained vacant unless the carrier accepted
an overload of reservations.8 Since that time, the number of accepted reservations has been determined by the booking curve.
The booking curve is a statistical correlation between the historical number of reservations and the number of holders who
actually show up for a flight.9 The booking curve is determined for
each flight and yields relatively fixed and accurate predictions for
the reservation turnover." If the booking curve indicates that
twenty out of one hundred reservations will be changed, cancelled
' Brief for the ATA, supra note 2, at 13. The association says most carriers
engage in overbooking to combat a chronic industry-wide problem of no-shows.
Overbooking is an attempt to increase the passenger load factor, otherwise the
air carriers would absorb enormous financial losses due to the empty seats caused
by no-shows and cancelled reservations. See Priority Rules, Denied Boarding
Compensation Tarifis and Reports of Unaccommodated Passengers: Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, CAB Docket No. 16563, 32 Fed. Reg. 459, 460 (CAB
Order EDR-109 (1967)).
8 "Overbooking may be defined as a controlled pre-departure activity that
takes place when a carrier intentionally books confirmed reservations in excess
of flight capacity." Comments of Delta Air Lines, Inc. on CAB EDR-296 [supra

note 1], at 2 [hereinafter referred to as Delta's Comments]. The comments are on
file with the CAB.
"CAB ERPI, supra note 2, at 823-26. In December, 1972, the industry statistics showed the total number of no-shows per flight was 21.2%. In December,
1973, the figure reached 24.7%. Comment, Federal Preemption of State Law:
The Example of Overbooking in the Airline Industry, 74 MIcH. L. REV. 1200,

1201 (1976).
10CAB ERPI, supra note 2; Brief for the ATA, supra note 2; Delta's Comments, supra note 8.
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or not honored, the carrier will accept one hundred twenty reservations for a plane that holds one hundred passengers. The problem
associated with overbooking arises when the prediction is inaccurate. If only eighteen reservations change, then one hundred two
passengers will desire boarding; therefore, two reservation holders
must be bumped since the capacity of the plane is only one hundred
passengers. CAB investigations have found the carrier's reservations systems to be 99.94% accurate.'" The most recent statistics
indicate:
Approximately 6,000 passengers were bumped from domestic
flights of certificated carriers in selected months in 1974 and
1975, according to CAB. During September and December 1974,
and March and June 1975, 5,941 passengers were denied boarding out of 19.9 million enplanements or 3.0 per 10,000 enplanements. Braniff and Allegheny had the lowest rates for trunk and
local service carriers with .7 and .3.
A review of the previous years' statistics and industry analysis indicates the following:
10,000 ENPLANEMENTS 8
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5.3
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PASSENGERS DENIED CONFIRMED SPACE PER
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Overbooking has evolved from the early practice of guessing the
11CAB

ERPI, supra note 2, at 829.

"Aviation Daily, Sept. 10, 1976, at 53.
"Delta's Comments, supra note 8; CAB form 251 in 14 C.F.R. S 250 (1975);
CAB EDR-296, supra note 1.
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booking curve to a highly technical procedure called Capacity
Management Programs." These programs utilize highly trained
and experienced airline reservations personnel to determine the
booking curve."
A clear distinction exists between overbooking and overselling
of airline flights.1" Overbooking is a pre-departure reservations procedure designed to fill previously reserved seats as they are vacated
due to reservation changes. Overselling is the consequential overload of reservations which can cause more reservation holders than
predicted to appear for a scheduled flight." Overselling is, therefore, the selling of more tickets than flight capacity. Overbooking
is primarily caused by errors in the prediction of the booking curve.
Overselling results from passenger-multiple-booking of reservations and failure of carriers to receive all reservations made by its
own employees and travel agents prior to departure time. Passengers make multiple reservations for two reasons: (1) because
they remain undecided on a convenient departure time, and (2)
the ones aware of overbooking multiple-book to insure against
being bumped." Multiple reservations are a major cause of oversales during peak travel times because the passengers making these
multiple reservations cause additional no-shows. These additional
no-shows distort the booking curve predictions."0
In order to combat multiple reservations and no-shows, carriers
take the following steps to improve their Capacity Management
Programs in order to reduce the number of bumped passengers:
1) Reservations personnel contact reservation holders to confirm
14Brief

for the ATA, supra note 2, at 11.
"Id. Delta's Comments, supra note 8.
10 Delta's Comments, supra note 8, at 2. Overbooking occurs frequently while
the occurrence of overselling is less frequent. Refer to the text accompanying
notes 12-13 supra. Overbooking is a deliberate attempt to combat no-shows while
overselling is the unexpected result of an erroneous booking curve prediction and
is not deliberately planned. Comments of Allegheny Airlines, Inc. on CAB
EDR-296, supra note 1 [hereinafter referred to as Allegheny's Comments].
1"Brief for the ATA, supra note 2, at 13; Delta's Comments, supra note 8,
at 3.
1"Civil Aeronautics Board Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 32 Fed. Reg.
460 (1967); see Ruppenthal, Bumping the Passenger, 190 NATION 551 (1960).
19CAB ERPI, supra note 2; see Comment, Discriminatory Bumping, 40 J.
AIR L. & COM. 533 (1974).
0Brief for the ATA, supra note 2; CAB ERPI, supra note 2.
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space on heavily booked flights in order to assure maximum utilization of seating capacity. 1
2) Carriers make computerized "dupe checks" to identify and
eliminate multiple reservations.'
3) Carriers cancel reservations of known or identifiable noshows. Carriers use post-departure reconciliation procedures to
cancel reservations of passengers who fail to show for the first leg
of a multiple leg flight. Absent such a reconciliation procedure,
that reservation would be retained throughout the entire trip causing no-shows for the carrier on the entire journey. The elimination
of these reservations allows the reserved but vacant seats to be resold to other passengers.'
4) Finally, carriers monitor the booking curve until departure
so that last minute reservations, no-shows, cancellations, and
changes may be correlated to prevent oversales."
B. Benefits of Overbooking
Overbooking has aided the growth and stability of air transportation by preserving reservations flexibility. 5 The current reservation
system offers maximum flexibility because a traveler may make a
reservation in advance of the desired flight and may cancel or fail
to honor his reservation without incurring any legal or financial
obligation. Overbooking has been determined by the carriers to
be the only practical method of combating no-shows while preserving the current flexible reservations system." Overbooking preserves these two aspects of the airline industry, yet assures the carrier of economic stability. This reasoning has been persuasive. For
instance, Archibald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. contains dicta stating that overbooking is economically mandated in
view of reservations cancellations and no-shows." The CAB has
'

Brief for the ATA, supra note 2, at 10.

22

Id. at 11.
"1d.at 10.
SId. at 10-11.
"CAB

ERPI, supra note 2. Comments of National Airlines, Inc. on CAB

EDR-296 [supra note I], at 1-2 [hereinafter referred to as National's Comments];
Delta's Comments, supra note 8, at 4; Allegheny's Comments, supra note 16.

"0Initial decisions CAB Docket No. 26253, Emergency Reservations Practices Investigation at 8-9 in 39 Fed. Reg. 823 (Jan. 3, 1974). Delta's Comments,
supra note 8; CAB ERPI, supra note 2.
"Archibald v. Pan Am. World Airways, 460 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1972).
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also supported overbooking as a means to combat economic and

fuel conservation pressures exerted on the airline industry."
CAB investigations and the courts have concluded that overbooking benefits the public and does not constitute deceptive trade

practices."' Overbooking is really a substitute for a penalty, forfeiture, or subsidy that would be necessary to compensate carriers
for the vacancies created by no-shows. If the carrier could not replace these vacancies with other reservations, the consumer would

have to pay higher fares, pay a penalty for not honoring the reservation, or pay for reservations in advance and forfeit part of the

purchase price if he failed to honor the reservation." It should be
noted that CAB investigations have found no substantial abuse of
overbooking in recent years. 1
Carriers contend that overbooking is needed now, more than
ever, to combat no-shows. Due to the recent publicity on overbooking, passengers have increased the incidence of multiple reser-

vations which increases the number of no-shows."
III. THE CAB

AND ITS REGULATIONS CONCERNING OVERBOOKING:
THE REGULATORY GAP

A. The CAB's Purpose and Functions
Section 1302 of the Federal Aviation Act states the CAB's statutory mandate is both to protect the consumer and promote the
carrier's operational efficiency and financial stability.3 The CAB is
2' CAB ERPI, supra note 2; see 86 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH. 39 (Jan. 23,
1967); see generally 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 259, 264 (1962).
21 CAB ERPI, supra note 2; Delta's Comments, supra note 8; Nader & The
Connecticut Citizens Action Group v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 641 (N.D.
Tex. 1976). Overbooking benefits the public by maintaining reservations freedom
by allowing "literally millions of airline seats to be sold and used each year by
persons who would otherwise be needlessly denied space." CAB EDR-109, supra
note 2; Brief for the ATA, supra note 2.
11 Brief for the ATA, supra note 2; National Airlines has requested that the
Civil Aeronautics Board renew penalties for no-shows if overbooking is prohibited
or labeled as a deceptive trade practice. National's Comments, supra note 25,
at 3.
21 CAB ERPI, supra note 2, at 4.
2 See note 1 supra.
" The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970). The Act provides:
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under
this chapter, the Board shall consider the following, among other
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charged with maintaining the most economical system attainable
given their duty to protect the consumer. The CAB has therefore
allowed carriers to eliminate the risks of underbooked flights and

resultant financial loss by permitting overbooking."
B. Current CAB Regulations Applicable to Overbooking

Section 1324 of the Federal Aviation Act allows the CAB to
promulgate rules necessary to carry out statutory duties.' As CAB
regulations do not expressly prohibit overbooking or directly reguthings, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the
public convenience and necessity:
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs of
the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the
Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to
recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in,
such transportation, and to improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service
by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations,
undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States,
of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and
(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil
aeronautics.
' 41 Fed. Reg. 40,500 (Sept. 20, 1976); see generally Russell, CAB and the
Consumer, 40 J. AIR L. & COM. 51 (1974). See also 14 C.F.R. § 221.177 (1977),
42 Fed. Reg. 12,420 (1977).
'The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1324 (1970). The Act provides:
(a) The Board is empowered to perform such acts, to conduct
such investigations, to issue and amend such orders, and to make
and amend such general or special rules, regulations, and procedure,
pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of this chapter, as
it shall deem necessary to carry out the provisions of, and to exercise and perform its powers and duties under, this chapter.
(b) The Board is empowered to confer with or to hold joint
hearings with any State aeronautical agency, or other State agency,
in connection with any matter arising under this chapter within its
jurisdiction, and to avail itself of the cooperation, services, records,
and facilities of such State agencies as fully as may be practicable
in the administration and enforcement of this chapter.
Pursuant to § 1324, the CAB has promulgated "Boarding Priority Rules" in 14
C.F.R. § 250 (1976).
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late the practice of overbooking, a regulatory gap has developed."
The boarding priority rules appear to condone the practice, since
the regulations contained therein address the remedies available
to bumped passengers. The intent of the boarding priority rules is
to prevent unlawful discrimination in determining priorities among
bumped passengers by providing a method for determining which
passengers will board first."7 The compensation to be given to
passengers denied boarding is also set forth in the boarding priority
rules.8' The CAB has also encouraged the carriers to improve their
Capacity Management Programs, thereby reducing the number of
oversales."
CAB regulations specifically require carriers to establish and
maintain boarding priority rules.' Boarding priority rules determine

which reservation holders will be allowed to board the aircraft
when oversales occur."1 Once a passenger has been bumped, the
carrier must offer an acceptable alternative flight or tender to the

passenger liquidated damages as a result of being bumped; this is
referred to as denied boarding compensation.' The boarding prior41 Fed. Reg. 40,500 (Sept. 20, 1976). Subsequent to the writing of this comment, the CAB has promulgated a rule, effective April 3, 1977, which requires
carriers to notify the public that air carriers overbook reservations. Carriers must
post and distribute the following notice:
Airline flights may be overbooked, and there is a slight chance that
a seat will not be available on a flight for which a person has a confirmed reservation. A person denied boarding on a flight may be
entitled to a compensatory payment. The rules for denied boarding
are available at all airport ticket counters. Re-examination of Board
Policies Concerning Deliberate Overbooking and Oversales, 14
C.F.R. S 221.177 (1977), 42 Fed. Reg. 12,420 (1977).
37 14 C.F.R. 5 250 (1976).
38 14 C.F.R. 5 250.9 (1976).
"Civil Aeronautics Board Notice of Proposed Rule Making, EDR-248 (June
4, 1973); Mortimer v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
"'The CAB regulations that apply to overbooking are set forth in 14 C.F.R.
250 (1976). The priority rules apply to carriers regulated by the CAB; id. S
250.2. The carriers are required to file their denied boarding compensation
amounts with the CAB and incorporate that into their tariffs. The rules require
carriers to establish priority rules for determining which passenger shall be
bumped and prohibit the carrier from giving undue preferences or advantages to
any particular person. Id. § 250.3.
4114 C.F.R. S 250.3 (1977). The boarding priority rules require the carrier
to tender the denied boarding compensation to the passenger as the CAB remedy
for overbooking. This tender if accepted relieves the carrier of all liability for all
claims that might accrue to the passenger as a result of the carrier's failure to
provide the passenger with space on the desired flight.
' Id. S 250.9. The procedure the carrier must follow when a reservation

10
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ity rules set forth the regulations detailing procedures for determining the amount of denied boarding compensation and the
mode of payment. 3 The amount of denied boarding compen-

sation is included in the carrier's tariff and the passenger is on
constructive notice of his remedy in the event he is bumped." By
accepting the denied boarding compensation or voucher the reservation holder receives a refund of his ticket price. ' The deadlines for accepting the CAB remedies are also set forth in the
boarding priority rules."' It may be assumed that most passengers
fail to read and understand the tariff provisions and are therefore
unaware that common-law claims and remedies exist. It is also

safe to assume that many passengers are unaware that commonlaw claims are waived upon accepting denied boarding compensation checks as liquidated damages."
holder is bumped is set forth in the boarding priority rules. This subpart briefly
states that the carrier must furnish the passengers who are denied boarding a
written statement explaining the terms and conditions of the denied boarding
compensation. Copies of the carrier's statements are also filed with the CAB.
3Id. In order to qualify for such compensation the passenger must have complied fully with the carrier's requirements as to ticketing, check-in, and reconfirmation procedures. Note a passenger is not eligible for denied boarding compensation if the flight for which he reserved space is overbooked due to a government requisition for space, safety or weather conditions, or if the carrier is
able to arrange comparable air transportation for the bumped passenger. Id. at
S250.4, .6-.10.
National Airlines Enforcement Proceeding, 31 C.A.B. 390 (1960).
14 C.F.R. 5 250.5 (1975). The amount of compensation paid constitutes
liquidated damages and when accepted by the passenger becomes the full amount
of damages recoverable under CAB regulations. Id. S 250.7.
-Id. § 250.8.
47

Id. S 250.6. The rule allows the passenger to waive all other claims as fol-

lows:
A passenger shall not be eligible for denied boarding compensation if:
(a) The flight for which the passenger holds confirmed reserved
space is unable to accommodate him because of: (1) Government
requisition of space; or (2) substitution of equipment of lesser capacity when required by operational and/or safety reasons; or
(b) The carrier arranges for comparable air transportation or
for other transportation accepted (i.e., used) by the passenger,
which, at the time either such arrangement is made, is planned to
arrive at the airport of the passenger's next stopover or, if none,
at the airport of his destination earlier than, or not later than 2
hours after, the time the direct or connecting flight, on which confirmed reserved space is held, is planned to arrive, in the case of
interstate and overseas air transportation, or 4 hours after such time
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In addition to the boarding priority rules, the CAB requires
carriers to submit reports concerning the number and frequency
of bumped passengers. ' These reports have been used to evaluate

the practice of overbooking to ascertain possible abuses of overbooking."'
The CAB rules seem adequate in theory. The bumped passenger,
however, is rarely satisfied with the regulatory remedy as evidenced
by the Nader case." Previous efforts to regulate overbooking have

been abandoned in favor of the current regulations which only redress, rather than abate, the cause of the overbooking dilemma."
The current regulations are inadequate since overbooking itself
is not regulated, and the regulations that do exist are unsatisfactory
to the consumer. Carriers themselves fail to adhere to the boarding
priority rules since many flights would be delayed if carriers strictly
adhered to the rules.5
in the case of foreign air transportation; or
(c) The passenger is accommodated on the flight for which he
holds confirmed reserved space, but is offered accommodations or
is seated in a section of the aircraft other than that specified in this
ticket at no extra charge: Provided, that a passenger seated in a
section for which a lower fare is charged shall be entitled to an appropriate refund.
For a discussion of alleged concealment and other possible reasons for the public's unfamiliarity with remedies available to bumped passengers, see generally
Comment, Federal Preemption of State Law: The Example Overbooking in the
Airline Industry, 74 MIcH. L. REV. 1200 (1976). Carriers do give bumped passengers constructive notice of the waiver of common claims since many carriers
include a waiver notice on the denied boarding compensation check.
4' 14 C.F.R. § 250.10 (1975). The provision requires carriers to file reports
every 45 days concerning the frequency of unaccommodated passengers. Id.
4
1 Id. CAB EDR-109, supra note 2.
"CAB

EDR-296, supra note 1, at 16749.

CAB has abandoned prior attempts to regulate overbooking and eliminate no-shows due to consumer resentment and unenforceability of the programs.
The CAB has demonstrated its awareness of the overbooking dilemma prior to
the adoption of the boarding priority rules. The CAB issued the following orders
regarding the no-show problem: CAB Order No. E-20859 (May 25, 1964);
CAB Order No. E-18268 (Apr. 27, 1962); CAB Order No. E-17914 (Jan. 8,
1962); CAB Order No. E-15615 (Aug. 4, 1960); CAB Order No. E-12817
(July 22, 1958); CAB Order No. E-12025 (Dec. 16, 1957); CAB Order No.
E-11658 (Aug. 6, 1957); CAB Order No. E-11007 (Feb. 6, 1957); CAB Order
No. E-10545 (Aug. 17, 1956); CAB Order No. E-9194 (Apr. 29, 1955).
"2Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also
"The

Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
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Nader v.

Allegheny Airlines, Inc.
A. Facts Giving Rise to the Controversy
Consumer advocate Ralph Nader held a reservation on an Allegheny Airlines flight which was overbooked by the carrier. Nader
was offered an alternate flight which would have delayed his arrival
by 55 minutes.' Nader refused the offer and requested that the
carrier's agent determine if the plane held any standbys or other
passengers who could be bumped. The agent refused, thereby violating the carrier's boarding priority rules. Consequently, Nader
took an Eastern Airlines flight to Boston and reached his destination by car." Due to the change in plans, Nader was unable to
address the Connecticut Citizens Action Group (CCAG)." Nader's
purpose for obtaining the reservation was to deliver a speech to the
CCAG and thereby raise funds for the group." CCAG lost donations presumably from the failure of Nader to attend the rally after
he was bumped. CCAG filed as a joint plaintiff and contended
that it detrimentally relied on the assumption that Allegheny would
honor Nader's reservation. 8 Nader did not accept a denied board
compensation check and thereby preserved his common-law cause
of action pursuant both to the CAB regulations and the Federal
Aviation Act's saving clause."
Nader startled the airline industry since he based his claim for
damages on two causes of action independent of CAB remedies.
The first cause of action was based on a statutory claim for
discrimination and is referred to as the statutory cause of ac51Nader
4

v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1973).

Id.

51Id.
"I d.
7Id.
Is Id.
5914 C.F.R. § 250 (1975).

See note 44 supra. Section 1106 of the Federal

Aviation Act of 1958, referred to as the savings clause states: "Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing

at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition
to such remedies." The test for survival of the common-law remedy is whether
the common-law remedy is inconsistent with the statutory scheme of regulation.
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, S 1106, 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1970). See generally Philco Corp. v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 171 N.W.2d 16 (1969).
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tion." The discrimination claim was based on the anti-discrimination clause of the Federal Aviation Act.6' Previous cases had held

that a carrier which ignores its boarding priority rules discriminates against the bumped passenger and therefore violates the
statutory discrimination provision.62 Nader contended that the car-

rier discriminated against him by not following the priority rules
and bumping standbys or lower priority reservation holders."
The second and more unexpected cause of action was based on

a common-law claim of fraudulent misrepresentation and is referred to as the common-law claim." The basis of this claim was
60365 F. Supp. at 132.

'Nader based the statutory claim on S 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958. The provision states:
No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause
any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation to
any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.
49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970).
"2Prior to the Nader case, the statutory discrimination provision was invoked
successfully in the following cases: Archibald v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d
14, 16-17 (9th Cir. 1972); Kaplan v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 12 Av. L.
REP. (CCH) 17,933 (E.D. Pa., Civil No. 68-2611, decided Apr. 9, 1973); Mortimer v. Delta Air Lines, 302 F. Supp. 276, 279 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Wills v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 365-66 (S.D. Cal. 1961); Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Tex. 1976). See generally Comment, Discriminatory Bumping, 40 J. AIR L. & COM. 533, 543 (1974).
" 365 F. Supp. at 132.
"Id. Nader based his claim on a common-law fraudulent misrepresentation.
Allegheny Airlines contended the CAB had primary jurisdiction to determine if
the claim was indeed fraudulent under § 411 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958. The provision states:
The Board may, upon its own initiative or upon complaint by any
air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent, if it considers that
such action by it would be in the interest of the public, investigate and determine whether any air carrier, foreign air carrier, or
ticket agent has been or is engaged in unfair or deceptive practices
or unfair methods of competition in air transportation or the sale
thereof. If the Board shall find, after notice and hearing, that such
air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent is engaged in such
unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition,
it shall order such air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent to
cease and desist from such practices or methods of competition.
49 U.S.C. 5 1381 (1970).
If the court had accepted Allegheny's claim, the carrier could have been immunized from common-law claims since a finding by the CAB that overbooking
is not fraudulent would have barred the cause of action. Nader v. Allegheny
Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. at 305.

14

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[43:1

that Allegheny deliberately misrepresented the status of Nader's
reservation. Nader contended the carrier fraudulently sought to conceal its overbooking practices and knew that passengers would rely
on the reservation and would be subject to great inconvenience
upon being bumped. 5
B. Disposition of the Case by the Trial Court
The trial court held Nader was entitled to both compensatory
damages and punitive damages under the anti-discrimination provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, since he established
a prima facie case of unreasonable discrimination." The court
stated that Nader established his prima facie case because he held a
confirmed reservation, the carrier intentionally oversold the plane's
capacity, and the carrier failed to honor Nader's reservation priority. The court stated the carrier failed to sustain its burden of proof
since the carrier permitted passengers with a lower priority to board
the plane instead of a passenger who had a higher priority and who
had not been informed of the risks attendant to the carrier's concealed practice of overbooking."7
The court also held that the carrier knowingly and intentionally
misrepresented a material fact, namely that Nader had a guaranteed
reservation for a seat, upon which both plaintiffs relied." The court
held that CCAG was entitled to recover both nominal and punitive
damages due to the carrier's misrepresentation, even though CCAG
was not a direct party to the transaction." The court stated that the
6365 F. Supp. at 132.
"Id.
6

7 Id.

68 Id. The court stated that the defendant intentionally sought to conceal the
overbooking practices from all of its passengers, particularly the victims of the
practice.
69 Id. at 132-33. The court stated:

CCAG is eligible and entitled to recover herein for damages it has
incurred due to the Defendant's intentional misrepresentation even
though they were not direct parties to the transaction in issue be-

cause: (1) the misrepresentation was knowingly and intentionally
made; privity of contract is not required here; (2) CCAG was
within the class of foreseeable plaintiffs (the class is determined
by the Defendant's legal duty to the public at large both under

its license and by its better position to prevent injury to the public
by full disclosure of its practices affecting the public); (3) CCAG
made a reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation and was thereby damaged. See Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19
VAND. L. REv. 231, 246, 250 (1966).
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intentional and substantial overselling of reservations without informing the public of the risks of overbooking justified an award
of punitive damages to both plaintiffs. The court upheld the misrepresentation claim since the carrier both sought to conceal such
information from the victims of the practice and did so wantonly
and maliciously."0
The trial court awarded Nader compensatory damages of $10
and punitive damages of $25,000; CCAG was awarded consequential damages of $51 for nominal damages and $25,000 for punitive
damages."1 Nader was not awarded consequential damages for losses
incurred as a result of being bumped.
C. U.S. Court of Appeals Holding
The appellate court reversed and remanded the district court's
holding." The court held that the judgment entered in favor of
Nader based on Allegheny's alleged violation of section 404(b) of
the Act should be reversed." The judgment in favor of CCAG, based
on fraudulent misrepresentation, was reversed since the appellate
court felt CCAG was in a class of persons without standing to sue
the carrier for misrepresentation." The court also reversed the
judgment in favor of Nader based on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim and instructed the district court to further stay the action
on that issue until the CAB exercised its primary jurisdiction to
determine if the overbooking was in fact a fraudulent misrepresentation." The court stated that punitive damages may ultimately be
awarded for misrepresentation unless the carrrier was acting on
7

Old. at 133.
134.
"'Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
71 Id. at

71Id. The court felt inconclusive evidence had been submitted to justify the
award and felt the judgment was tainted by legal conclusions. Allegheny's boarding priority rules provide that if gate check-in is used, and oversales cannot be
ascertained in advance of boarding, then rather than delaying the flight by attempting to select a passenger on board to be bumped who is less inconvenienced,
the selection is automatic. The first person to arrive at the gate after the plane is
filled will be the first oversale, and so forth. Brief for the ATA, supra note 2, at
10-12; Comment, Discriminatory Bumping, 40 J. AIR L. & COM. 533 (1974);

Comment, Court Usurpation of CAB Function: The Problem of the "Bumped"
Passenger, 43 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 112 (1974).
74512 F.2d at 549. The court held the statute was intended to protect only
those persons who had attained passenger status and did not contemplate protecting persons relying on a reservation holder's reservation.
7
1Id. at 552.
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the good faith belief that overbooking carried the CAB's approval."8
The court therefore held that the cause of action based on misrepresentation must be stayed due to primary jurisdiction; consequential damages were too remote to be recovered and the evidence
did not support the award of the punitive damages based on the
statutory claim of discrimination." On remand the district court
was to re-examine the evidence to determine if punitive damages
were warranted under the misrepresentation claim since the appellate court believed the agent's bad faith must first be determined.'
D. Disposition by the Supreme Court
The sole issue appealed to the Supreme Court was the applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to stay the cause of
action not dispensed by the CAB." That is, must the CAB be given
an opportunity to determine if Allegheny's failure to disclose its
overbooking and bumping practices constitute deception under
section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act before Nader's commonlaw claim based on fraudulent misrepresentation can proceed?"0
The Supreme Court held that the trial of Nader's common-law
claim need not await the CAB's administrative determination as
to the issue of deception. 1 The court reasoned that the Federal
Aviation Act's savings clause preserved common-law remedies since
the field has not yet been preempted by Congress." Therefore, state
common-law claims may be pursued notwithstanding CAB remedies available to bumped passengers.
The Supreme Court distinguished the savings clause in the Federal Aviation Act from a similar clause in the Interstate Commerce
Act.83 The court of appeals in Nader stated that the savings clause
should not be interpreted literally due to the case of Texas &
Pacific Railway v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co." In Texas & Pacific Railway the Supreme Court refused to permit a common-law action
78

Id.

77Id.
78Id.

71Nader
0

v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
1 Id.at 298.
8'Id. at 301.
12 Id. at 298.
3Id. at 298-99.
84204 U.S. 426 (1907).
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challenging a carrier's rate as unreasonable since the survival of
such a cause of action would deprive the statute of its efficacy; "in
other words, [it would] render its provisions nugatory."'' The appellate court in Nader therefore held that the savings clause could not
be interpreted literally since the pre-existing right was repugnant to
the purpose of the statute.86 The Supreme Court stated that the
distinguishing factor between the Nader and Texas & Pacific Railway cases was the subject matter upon which the two pre-existing
claims dealt. In Nader, unlike Texas & Pacific Railway, there is no
irreconcilable conflict between the statutory scheme and the persistence of the common-law remedies." The Supreme Court stated
that:
The court in the present case, in contrast, is not called upon to
substitute its judgment for the agency's on the reasonableness of
a rate-or, indeed, on the reasonableness of any carrier practice.
There is no Board requirement that air carriers engage in overbooking ....[A]ny impact on rates that may result from the imposition of tort liability . . . would be merely incidental."
The Court went one step further and reasoned that the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction was not applicable to overbooking since the
CAB has not expressly regulated overbooking.' The concurring
opinion of Justice White states that the CAB cannot acquire primary jurisdiction over either the common law or statutory cause of
action:
It may be that under its rulemaking authority the Board would
have power to order airline overbooking and to pre-empt recoveries
under state law for undisclosed overbooking . . . .But it has not
done so . . . .Neither an order denying nor one granting relief
under that section would foreclose claims based on state law . . .8
The Court distinguished between preemption and primary jurisdiction and implied that Congress could preempt state law recoveries.
Therefore, in the absence of preemption, the only manner by which
85 Id.

at 437. Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976).

426 U.S. at 298.
'7 Id. The I.C.C. provision was not intended to defeat all common-law claims,
only those inconsistent with the statute.
"1426 U.S. at 301.
89Id.
80 Id.
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state law claims may be stayed is through the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. However, the doctrine does not seem to be applicable
to the issues of misrepresentation or discrimination. The Court
stated that:
The action brought by petitioner does not turn on a determination
of the reasonableness of a challenged practice-a determination
that could be facilitated by an informed evaluation of the economics or technology of the regulated industry. The standards to
be applied in an action for fraudulent misrepresentation are within
the conventional competence of the courts, and the judgment of a
technically expert body is not likely to be helpful in the application
of these standards to the facts of this case."
E. The Issues Unresolved by the Supreme Court's Opinion: The
Furies of Pandora's Box
One effect of the Supreme Court's holding is that the public is
now more keenly aware of both CAB and judicial remedies available to bumped passengers. The passenger may elect the CAB remedy of denied boarding compensation, or sue for damages based on
either the statutory cause of action for discrimination when the
carrier violates its boarding priority rules, or elect the common-law
remedy and sue for damages based on a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. The coexistence of the statutory and judicial remedies upsets the status quo since carriers are now subject to liability
beyond the limited award of denied boarding compensation as
liquidated damages.
The impact of the Nader case is therefore the existence of unresolved issues as to the extent of liability and co-existence of both
CAB and judicial remedies.' The decision has created confusion
since the carriers must now use overbooking at the risk of being
subjected to punitive damages. 3 The carriers are therefore subject
to tort liability rather than contractual liability." This confusion
91Id. at 300.

9 See Tariff Rules filed by American Airlines, Inc. in Petition of American
Airlines for reconsideration of Order 7608-58, August 23, 1976. 41 Fed. Reg.
40,543 (Sep. 20, 1976). The text of the Federal Register also contains a listing of
carriers that have filed for a tariff amendment which would provide constructive
notice of overbooking in an attempt to give the public notice of overbooking
and thereby preclude the claim based on mispresentation.
9
See also Comment, Federal Preemption of State Law: The Example of
Overbooking in the Airline Industry, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1200 (1976).
94426

U.S. at 300.
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may well result in more litigation, since the Supreme Court did not
address the issues of punitive or consequential damages." Due to
the Supreme Court's limited holding, the court of appeals decision
and previous precedent therefore remain intact." Following Nader,
the state of the law may be summarized as follows:
1) overbooking is not, per se, deceptive or prohibited;"'
2) a bumped passenger may elect either the CAB remedy or an
alternate flight, accept a denied boarding pass check or pursue
judicial relief based either on common-law misrepresentation
or statutory discrimination;"
3) the bumped passenger may receive actual and punitive damages under both the common-law and statutory claims;"
4) consequential damages to the bumped passenger or to persons
relying on his reservation are too remote to be recovered;'"
5) judicial and administrative relief coexist, since overbooking is
not yet within the subject matter applicable to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.'
V.

THE CURRENT RESERVATIONS SYSTEM MUST BE CHANGED
DUE TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE

Nader CASE

A. Can the CAB Obtain Primary Jurisdiction on Overbooking?
The Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is concerned with promoting the proper relationships between
the courts and administrative agencies charged with specific regulatory duties."2 The high court also stated that when common-law
"I1d.

at n.19. The Court stated:

As the issues of ultimate liability and damages are not before us, we
express no opinion as to their merits. We conclude that mere compliance with agency regulations is not sufficient in itself under the
Act to exempt a carrier from common-law liability. We make
clear, however, that this conclusion is not intended to foreclose the

courts on remand from considering, in relation to other issues in
the case, evidence that the Board was fully advised of the practice

complained of, and that the carrier had cooperated with the Board.
"Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
11 Id; Archibald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1972).
98 14 C.F.R. § 250 (1976); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290
(1976); Mortimer v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
9Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1973).

'0"Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
01Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
102id. at 299.
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rights and remedies survive and the agency lacks the power to
grant immunity from the common liability, the subject matter of
the dispute must be analyzed to determine if the doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes judicial determination."3 If the issue
is consistent with the business entrusted to that agency or where
the legal issues are better resolved by the agency than by the courts,
due to the agency's special expertise in the field, then the doctrine
applies.'" The principal reason for primary jurisdiction, therefore,
is the need for sensible coordination of the expertise of courts and
agencies. Each is best suited to resolve the subject matter for which
it is best qualified.10"
In order for the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to bar or stay
judicial adjudication, the issue must be within the agency's sphere
of statutory duties.'" Examples of such listed in the Supreme
Court's opinion include questions pertaining to the validity of rates
or tariff provisions."' If the CAB were to expressly regulate overbooking by incorporating the practice into the carrier's tariff and
expressly compel the carriers to overbook, the CAB would have
primary jurisdiction over the practice of overbooking.' It appears
that agency regulation ordinarily can stay court adjudication. The
Supreme Court, however, distinguished the subject matter of overbooking and its remedies by stating that the subject matter of overbooking is of a type that is suited to agency expertise, but that
0
misrepresentation and discrimination are not.""

"IId.

See United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956); see also

Far E. Conf. v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
14 See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT
105Id.

§

19.01 (3d ed. 1972).

'0 The Agency must have subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
107Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976); see Danna v.
Air Fr., 463 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1972).
1 Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976). The recent CAB

rule which requires carriers to advise the public of airline overbooking of reservations is probably insufficient to invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
since overbooking is not regulated by the rule; carriers are merely required to
give notice of the practice. See 42 Fed. Reg. 12,420 for the text of 14 C.F.R.

221.177 (1977).
'"The Court stated:

The action brought by petitioner does not turn on a determination
of the reasonableness of a challenged practice-a determination
that could be facilitated by an informed evaluation of the economics
or technology of the regulated industry. The standards to be ap-

plied in an action for fraudulent misrepresentation are within the
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B. The Common-Law Remedies Could Be Abrogated if Congress
Were to Preempt Overbooking Remedies.
The common-law claims could be abrogated if the Federal
Aviation Act's savings clause were amended so as to preempt the

field."' The CAB regulations providing for alternative remedies
would also need to be amended.111 The CAB could then expressly
regulate overbooking to provide exclusive remedies and therefore
invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction since the remedies would

now be more appropriately determined by the agency using its technical expertise.11' CAB regulation of overbooking, in the absence
of abrogating the Act's savings clause, would not be sufficient to

preclude common-law claims. It should be noted that the CAB
has previously rejected a carrier's proposal to make the CAB
remedies exclusive and thereby preclude judicial remedies.113 Therefore, due to the Nader case, under the Federal Aviation Act's
savings clause and current CAB regulations, bumped passengers

may elect either administrative or judicial relief.1 '
C. Must the Carrier Violate Its Boarding Priority Rules as a Prerequisite to Invoking JudicialRelief?
Prior to Nader, carriers have infrequently been subject to punitive damages based on the statutory cause of action for discriminaconventional competence of the courts, and the judgment of a
technically expert body is not likely to be helpful in the application of these standards to the facts of this case.
426 U.S. at 298.
'10 "It may be that under its rulemaking authority the Board would have the
power to order airline overbooking and to pre-empt the recoveries under state
law for undisclosed overbooking or overselling. But it has not done so, at least
as yet." 426 U.S. 290, 302 (White, J., concurring).
111
d. 14 C.F.R. § 250 (1975).
112 In response to the exclusiveness of remedies, the Supreme Court stated that:
For example, if respondent's overbooking practices were detailed in
its tariff and therefore available to the public, a court presented
with a claim of misrepresentation based on failure to disclose
need not make prior reference to the Board, as it should if presented with a suit challenging the reasonableness of practices detailed
in a tariff.
426 U.S. at 298 n.14.
" Domestic Trunklines Tariff Agreement, 35 C.A.B. 881, CAB Order No.
E-18064 (1963).
114 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
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tion."' One aspect of the Nader case, in addition to earlier precedent, involved discrimination resulting from failure to abide by the
established boarding priority rules.' A review of the earlier cases
indicates that the discrimination cause of action arose from the
disregard of the boarding priority rules."' It seems that the boarding priority violation is a prerequisite only for obtaining damages
based on the statutory discrimination claim and is not relevant for
the claim of misrepresentation. "a
The Nader case indicates that a claim based on misrepresentation exists. Nader, however, did not clearly define the elements and
burden of proof, since the court of appeals reversed the district
court's conclusions."' It would appear that the claim for misrepresentation arises after the reservation holder is both deliberately
overbooked and then denied boarding. At this juncture, he is entitled to CAB remedies or common-law remedies."" The additional
violation of the boarding priority rules, therefore, gives rise to an
independent cause of action from the misrepresentation claim.
D. The Spectre of Pandora'sBox: CarriersAre Subject to Punitive
Damages Both for Discriminationand Misrepresentation.
Assuming the carrier has committed a fraudulent misrepresentation or violated his boarding priority rules, the question of recoverable damages must be considered. The basic foundation of damages may be summarized as follows: "[O]ne who suffers a legally
recognized wrong or injury is usually entitled to an award of
"'See note 2 supra; see Comment, Discriminatory Bumping, 40 J. AIR L. &
COM. 533 (1974) and Comment, Court Usurption of CAB Function: The Problem of the "Bumped" Passenger, 43 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 112 (1974) for discussions
of the discrimination cases wherein punitive damages have been allowed.
"' See id.
"' See note 62 supra.
"

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

119Id.

" ld; 14 C.F.R. § 250 (1975). The trial court in Nader found that Allegheny
misrepresented a material fact, whereas the Court of Appeals stated the lower
court failed to define the burden of proof. The Court of Appeals stated that the
accepted definition for fraudulent misrepresentation is: a false misrepresentation,
in reference to a present material fact made with knowledge of its falsity, and
made with intent to deceive that causes action to be taken in reliance upon that
misrepresentation. 512 F.2d at 541 n.32. For a discussion of when a claim arises
for misrepresentation, see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 684-85 (4th ed.
1971) [hereinafter referred to as PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS].
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damages.''. There are two major subdivisions of damages: general
and special."' General damages are those that naturally flow from
the injury, such as actual damages, compensatory damages, nominal damages, punitive damages." Special damages are awarded
in addition to general damages to compensate the injured party
for injuries caused by the defendant, but are not of the type ordinarily expected. Special damages include items of peculiar loss to
that injured party." ' Consequential damages are a subdivision of
special damages."
Compensatory damages, such as Nader was awarded, seek to restore the injured party to his original position and include items
such as actual losses arising from the tort, pain and suffering, and
humiliation."" There are three distinct requirements for an award
of compensatory damages:
1) the defendant's action must in fact cause the injury (overbooking obviously caused the reservation holder to be bumped);"'
2) the plaintiff must prove the amount of injury suffered to a reasonable degree of certainty; and"'
3) finally, the compensatory damages awarded must not be too
remotely caused by the defendant."' Injuries resulting from being bumped, such as inability to address the CCAG at the
advertised time, are too remote to be recovered under compensatory damages."' The test for remoteness is the notorious
121DOBBS,

HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES S

3.1 (1973)

[hereinafter

referred to as DOBBS].
122Id. at §§ 3.2, 3.3.
123Id.

124 Id. See also Monarch Brewing Co. v. George J. Meyer Mfg. Co., 130 F.2d
582 (9th Cir. 1942). For a discussion of instances wherein carriers have been
subject to consequential damages in shipping cases, see Comment, Consequential
and Special Damages: Tempest in the Tariff, 40 J. AIR L. & COM. 704 (1974).
"5 Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1973); see
Hycel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 190, 193 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
"' Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1973).
"'DoaBs,
supra note 121, at §§ 3.2-.3.
2' Id. Actual damages are easily ascertained since the most immediate injury
is the denial of boarding and is compensated for by the payment of denied boarding compensation as liquidated damages for the cost of the flight. Nader was only
awarded $10.00 in compensatory damages, $3.00 of which was for the additional
cost of a ticket to Boston, the alternate flight chosen by Nader, and $7.00 incurred in long distance phone calls. 512 F.2d at 532.
121Id. DOBBS, supra note 121, at §§ 3.2-.3.
ISO
Id.
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proximate cause test for tort injuries and the rule of Hadley v.
Baxendale for contractual breaches."1
Apparently, the carriers are not as concerned about the award
of compensatory damages as they are with punitive and consequential damages. This is because the amount of compensatory
damages approximates the liquidated damages currently provided
for under CAB regulations.
Punitive damages are awarded to punish the defendant and deter
future violations, and they are awarded in addition to compensatory damages.13 The basis of punitive damages is that the aggravated, willful, wanton misconduct should be punished as a matter
of public policy." The test for such an award is commonly that:
1) the plaintiff must first recover compensatory damages; 3 '
2) the award of punitive damages must be commensurate with
the amount of compensatory damages and the injury sought
to be redressed; and ""
3) the defendant must have acted with sufficient malice or with
willful, wanton conduct that mandates punishment; negligence
or willful conduct alone is not sufficient to justify punitive
damages."'
Punitive damages are further limited in that:
1) equity will not grant punitive damages; 3 '
2) a principal is not vicariously liable for culpable torts of his
servants; and"
3) mass disaster litigation against one or a small number of de31Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 ENG. REP. 145 (Ex. 1854); accord Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903); see DOBBS, supra note

121, at §5 3.2-.3.
"I DOBBS,

supra note 121, at 5 3.9;

PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS,

supra note 120,

at 5§ 209-10.
13Wills
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 367-68 (S.D. Cal.
1961). See generally Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Clay, 194 F.2d

888 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
134DoBBs, supra note 121, at § 3.9.
135 Id.
1N8 Id.

137 [d.
8

13 Id.
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fendants shall not yield punitive damages;'" the defendant's
conduct must be directed solely toward one individual.""
The particular tort is not as determinative as are the defendant's
motives and conduct by which the tort was committed."'" The actor's motives are, therefore, crucial to the award, since mere inadvertence will not suffice to support an award of punitive damages."
These elementary guidelines may be applied to the overbooking
situation. The district court held that the misrepresentation was
of such bad faith and malicious intent that the carrrier should be
punished for the deception.1" That holding was reversed and remanded for further showing of actual malice and wanton intent.'"
Punitive damages ordinarily require a showing of malicious intent
upon a single victim. Consequently, it is extremely difficult "to
perceive how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity
of actions throughout the nation can be administered so as to avoid
an overkill." Overbooking is directed at neutralizing the impersonal
no-show or reservation changes and is not specifically directed at
any individual reservation holder.1" Overbooking does not meet
the test for maliciousness, as it is a mere error in predicting the
reservations turnover. The practice of overbooking reservations
also is not malicious, since carriers do not intend overbooking to
result in bumped passengers. Overbooking is regarded by the CAB
and most carriers as the only means of combating no-shows and
reservations turnover while maintaining the flexibility of the cur139 Id.
140 Typical

examples wherein punitive damages have been awarded include:

assault, battery, libel, slander, deceit, seduction, alienation of affections, malicious
prosecution, trespass. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 120, at § 2.
141 Id. See DOBBS, supra note 121, at § 3.9.
112 "[Miere inadvertence or even gross negligence will not suffice to support an
award of punitive damages." Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527,

549 (D.C. Cir. 1975). It would seem that no punitive damages should be assessed
in instances of overbooking errors due to travel agent's failure to transmit all the
reservations, carrier clerical errors, etc., since this would be characterized as inadvertence rather than malicious intent. See generally Black v. Sheraton Corp. of
America, 47 F.R.D. 263 (D.D.C. 1969). "The tort must be aggravated by an
evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression."
14 Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1973).
144 Nader

4

1967).

v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

ld. See also Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.
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rent systems."' Most carriers assume the practice is not fraudulently
misrepresentative and are justified in their belief that CAB supports
and condones overbooking. " Given CAB tacit support, how can
a nondisclosure of overbooking practices to the reservation holders
equal individually directed, wanton, malicious conduct that deserves punishment?'. 8
Punitive damages have been awarded, and rightly so, in cases
wherein the carrier's agent unjustly discriminated against an individual reservation holder." 9 When a carrier breaches his boarding priority rules in a manner that the reservation holder is subjected to malicious discrimination, the traditional test for punitive
damages is met. 5 '
Wills v. Transworld Airlines, Inc. introduced the award of punitive damages for unjust discrimination. 5' In Wills, an economy passenger was denied a seat on an oversold flight so that the airline
could accommodate all of its first class passengers. The airline intentionally violated its boarding priority rules and maliciously refused to verify the bumped passenger's statement that he had conformed to the carrier's reservation rules.'"' The plaintiff based his
action on the discrimination section of the Federal Aviation Act.""
The court held that specific statutory authority to bring the action
is not an essential prerequisite to the existence of a federal court's
power to grant relief by damages in order to enforce the intent of
the statute."' Primary jurisdiction was no bar, since the discrimination involved subject matter most appropriately reserved to the
courts and not to the CAB.'
' See the Comments of Delta, National, and Allegheny Airlines, supra notes
8, 25, 16; CAB ERPI, supra note 2; CAB EDR-109, supra note 2.
11 CAB ERPI, supra note 2. The administrative law judge stated: "It is clear
from the record as the Board has previously recognized, deliberate overbooking
is neither inherently evil nor necessarily adverse to the public interest."
The basis of his finding and previous other carrier investigations have led the
carriers to believe overbooking is condoned by the CAB; this belief is reflected
in the Carriers' Comments, supra notes 8, 16, 25.
148See id.
14949 U.S.C. § 1374 (1970).
"0 14 C.F.R. § 250 (1975).

"1200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).

Id.

152

'49 U.S.C. 5 1374 (1975).
'"200 F. Supp. at 364.
15 Id.
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An essential finding of the court's reasoning in the Wills case
was that the deprivation of contractual rights of an airline passenger by unreasonable and unjust discrimination in removing
him from a flight on which he had priority exhibited an "entire
want of care" for the rights of passengers which had substantially oversold reservations on a number of flights and amounted to tortious conduct by the company.15' The passenger was
entitled to punitive damages of $5,000; the court held the carrier liable for tortious discrimination arising from a contractual
obligation." ' The conduct that justified the award of punitive
damages in Wills was the carrier's refusal to verify the plaintiff's assertion that he had complied with the carrier's rules and
was entitled to priority. The refusal to permit the plaintiff to board
despite prior confirmation exhibited an "entire want of care" for
the right of the passenger to travel without unreasonable discrimination."' The award of punitive damages was further justified because the carrier "acted wantonly, or oppressively, or with such
malice as implies a spirit of mischief or criminal indifference to
civil obligations."''
Later cases have imposed a stricter burden of proof to justify the
award. In Kaplan v. Lufthansa German Airlines, the carrier also
disregarded its priority rules but the court awarded only compensatory damages for the unjust discrimination and disallowed the
punitive award."' The case stands for the proposition that overbooking itself, even if deliberate, does not justify the award of
punitive damages absent a showing of malicious intent.''
The trend continued and was clarified by Mortimer v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., where the court held that a cause of action may be
based on the discriminatory tort, but not for breach of contractual
duty:
The basis of this action is not breach of contract of carriage which
is the basis of (liquidated damages) denied boarding compensa116Id. at 367.

1571d. at 368.
"58

Id. at 367.

591d. (quoting Lake Shore M.S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 107

(1893)).

"Kaplan v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 12 Av. CAs. 17,933 (E.D. Pa.
1973).
' Id. at 17,935.
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tion, but rather violation of the antidiscrimination and preference
section of the Federal Aviation Act. Denied boarding compensation is payable to a passenger . . .regardless of whether he has

been the victim of discrimination or undue preference.1
Mortimer also stands for the proposition that a bumped passenger
is eligible for denied boarding compensation under breach of contract, but the judiciary remedy is pursued as a tort cause of action
for the discrimination exhibited in the violation of the boarding
priority rules."3 The court stated that the public policy of allowing
recovery of punitive damages was that the Federal Aviation Act
established a "public interest and right to nondiscriminatory and
fair treatment by air carriers and that in the absence of a civil
remedy past injuries caused by violation of that right would go
uncompensated." 1" Mortimer also decided that the statutory discrimination cause of action may be pursued in lieu of the CAB
remedies which were not available when Wills was decided." 5 The
court stated the CAB remedies were based on a breach of contract
of carriage, ' while the statutory cause of action was based on a
tort claim. The purpose of the CAB remedy was to compensate for
being denied boarding, while the purpose of the statutory cause of
action was to punish the carrier for his conduct. The court stated:
This remedy is not equivalent to or an expansion of denied boarding compensation under the regulations. It provides redress for
injury caused by discrimination, disadvantage or undue preference
whether racially, religiously, or economically motivated or that
results from the carrier's disregard for its own priority rules or
from the fact that those rules themselves are in themselves discriminatory ....

The denied boarding compensation ...

was not

intended to be the exclusive remedy."'
Additional bumped passenger litigation may be forthcoming in
light of Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc.1"' The facts in this
case were similar to Nader and the other discrimination cases
discussed above. The reservation holder in Smith was bumped
1"2

302 F. Supp. 276, 281 (N.D. Ill.1969).

163 Id.
164

Id. at 279.

1s Id. at 280-8 1.
166Id.
107

Id.

166412 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
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from an overbooked flight and discriminated against by the carrier's failure to obey its boarding priority rules.1" The cause of
action also alleged fraud under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act."' The court awarded punitive damages because the
agent was instructed to disregard its boarding priority rules if adherence would delay the ffight.'' The agent rudely insulted the
plaintiff and maliciously refused to remove the passenger's luggage
from the plane." The court held that the rudeness and overbooking
did not constitute fraud or deceptive practices under the Texas
statute. 3
It appears fairly clear that punitive damages are not allowed
unless the boarding priority rules are ignored. In Stough v. North
Central Airlines, Inc., punitive damages were disallowed when
the carrier bumped the reservation holder due to bad weather, despite the fact the flight was overbooked. It should be noted that
there was no violation of the boarding priority rules."'
The burden of proof necessary to recover punitive damages was
stated in Archibald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.; the
court perceived both Wills and Stough to stand for the proposition
that punitive damages are only allowed when the carrier disregards
its boarding priority rules.' A prima facie case is established when
the plaintiff proves the carrier departed from his boarding priority
rules, at which time the burden shifts to the carrier to show an
absence of discrimination to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case."'
169 Id.
170Id.

TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.

§

17.01 et seq. (1970).

412 F. Supp. at 642-43.
1712
Id. at 643.
171 Id. The CAB is currently requesting comments concerning the issuance of
a policy statement regarding overbooking as a deceptive trade practice. See note
1 supra. The deceptive trade provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
have been construed to have a broader concept than the common-law idea
of unfair practices and unfair competition. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 411,
49 U.S.C. S 1381 (1970). The provision is for antitrust investigations and is distinguished from the basis of Nader's cause of action based on the common-law
claim of misrepresentation.
174 55 fl. App. 2d 338, 204 N.E.2d 792 (1965).
175 Id. at 797.
176 460 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1972). See Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200
F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961); Stough v. North Central Airlines, Inc., 55 Ill.
App. 2d 338, 204 N.E.2d 792 (1965).
'17

177460 F.2d 14, 17 (9th Cir. 1972).
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An airline may establish rules for determining which passengers
to bump so long as the individual is not subject to unjust discrimination. For instance, a carrier may base its priority on the passenger's check-in time, as opposed to the standard policy of earliest
reservation booking date." 8
It appears that if punitive damages were more freely awarded,
a drop in airline revenues would be inevitable and the consumer
7 ' It is, therefore, consistent with
would eventually bear the cost."
public policy to limit the award of punitive damages only to the
discrimination situations and not extend the award also to the
common-law claim of misrepresentation. The CAB itself has
stated no public policy would be furthered by such an award
because:
The airline passenger has substantial freedom of choice to make
reservations ... and to cancel them .... [H]e is free ... to use his
ticket on flights of other air carriers without endorsement. A system
with such built-in mobility for the passenger inevitably breeds the
deliberate no-show who, in times when airline seats are in short
supply, will undertake to protect himself by making multiple reservations which he is free to disregard with impunity.'8
It would therefore appear that on remand the district court in Nader
should not allow punitive damages based on the common-law
fraudulent misrepresentation claim. To allow punitive damages
would abrogate the finding of the court of appeals that there was
no evidence to support an affirmative finding of misrepresentation
and that overbooking was a nondisclosure rather than a misrepresentation.18 There was also an absence of malice which is a prerequisite for the award since the carrier assumed overbooking was
not a deceptive trade practice pursuant to the CAB investigations.1 '
E. The Ultimate Liability: Consequential Damages
Since the Supreme Court did not consider the issue of consequential damages in Nader, it is foreseeable that a later court could
' See note 62 supra.
Brief for the ATA, supra note 2, at 20; CAB ERPI, supra note 2, at 8-9.

179

110 Brief for the ATA, supra note 2, at 21-22, citing CAB ERPI, supra note 2,

at 8-9.
'

512 F.2d at 551, 553.

182Brief for ATA, supra note 2, at 17, citing CAB ERPI, supra note 2, at 54.
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sustain such an award. " ' Consequential damages could be awarded
to the bumped passenger for losses incurred as a result of being
bumped. 8 ' Consequential damages could also be awarded to unforeseen plaintiffs also relying on that passenger's reservation. It
should be noted that the court of appeals in the Nader case stated
that the question of consequential damages awarded to bumped
passengers was one of first impression." 5
The issue of an unforeseen plaintiff, as an aspect of consequential damages under the proximate cause test, arose in 1928 in the
case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad.'6 The case has become
one of the most debated tort cases.8 " The case has been cited in
support of the familiar rule that a statute intended to protect a particular class of persons or guard against a particular risk or harm
creates no duty to any other class, such as an unforeseen plaintiff."'
Later cases seem to adhere to the policy of strict statutory construction answered in Palsgrafand continue to refuse to extend the scope
of the statute beyond the narrow legislative purpose.'" The Federal
Aviation Act seeks to create safe and efficient air carriage and
does not render the carrier an insurer of the reservation holder's
purpose in making the reservation, according to Nader. The court
of appeals correctly held that the CCAG was not within the class
18 426 U.S. 290.
184 Cases are being filed against carriers for consequential damages. An interesting example is as follows:
Howard Card has filed a $25,000 damage suit in Newark, N. J.,
against KLM Royal Dutch Airlines for bumping him off a plane
and making him miss the biggest event of his life-his inauguration

as mayor of Riverdale, N. J. The mayor, who was elected to the
part-time post last November, filed the federal suit against KLM

because he was unable to get home in time for his inauguration
Jan. 3. Card, 54, said he went to Arube in the Caribbean for a
vacation and expected to board a plane home Jan. 2. But he said
officials told him there were no seats left on the plane. The mayor
of the town of 3,000 said he was forced to stay overnight and cancel the inauguration, an action he said caused 'irreparable damage

to his reputation and esteem.'
"Apparently, the question of third party recovery for fraudulent misrepresentation is virtually one of first impression . . . ." 512 F.2d at 547.
'16Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); see
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 120, at 254.
87
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 120, at 254.
18 Id. at 255.
'1

8
'Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
I ld; Brief for the ATA, supra note 2.
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of persons that the act sought to protect. Prior to Nader, no express
public duty had been imposed on the carrier with regard to guaranteeing reliance on reservations by third persons." 1 Without such
an express duty, there is no justification which would warrant the
imposition of strict liability that would result if the carrier had to
pay consequential damages to unforeseen plaintiffs.
The court of appeals in Nader also stated that no public policy
would be furthered by an award of consequential damages to
CCAG" ' The court desired to keep tort liability within its current bounds by refusing the award of consequential damages because the level of the carrier's culpability or fault in overbooking
is too disproportionate to the liability imposed by consequential
damages.'" Since the carrier overbooks to abate a chronic industry problem of no-shows and reservation turnovers, and the reservation holders themselves cause that problem yet are under no
duty to honor any reservations made, the carrier should not be
held liable to distant persons relying on the unconstrained reservation maker. '" A duty should not exist to insure reservations since
many passengers take advantage of the current reservations flexibility by multiple-booking so that they will have a reservation when
their personal schedule permits. This conduct causes other persons
to be bumped and is a major cause of the no-show problem."" It
is, therefore, extremely difficult to see how a "non-representation"
to the reservation maker can warrant consequential damages to
third persons since the carrier has no contact with, or owes any
duty to, unforeseen plaintiffs.
The carrier also should not be liable to the bumped passenger
for his consequential losses incurred as a result of being bumped,
since traditional detrimental reliance causes of action have been
associated with affirmative or fraudulent misrepresentations.'" An
award of consequential damages would give the reservation holder
not only the transportation for which there is consideration, but
' Brief for the ATA, supra note 2.
19 512 F.2d at 549.
103
Id;
9

Brief for the ATA, supra note 2.

. The court of appeals stated the statute was intended to protect passengers,
not third persons. 512 F.2d at 533.
CAB ERPI, supra note 2; Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Delta's Comments, supra note 8.
"' PROSSER, LAW OF

TORTS, supra note 120; DOBBS, supra note 121.
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would guarantee compensation for consequential losses if the passenger were bumped. The burden of proof for such special damages
is more stringent than the proof required for general damages, e.g.,
compensatory damages."" If consequential damages were allowed,
all the plaintiff would have to prove is that he was denied boarding,
regardless of the reason. He could then presumably recover any
possible loss. The requirement of proving damages with a reasonable degree of certainty could be emasculated if the plaintiff could
recover for the loss of business transactions not yet finalized, grief
suffered for the loss of not comforting a dying relative, or any other
infinite range of reasons for making reservations. Consequential
damages have been defined as those which follow pursuant to
special conditions imposing a higher than normal degree of care."
The duty of care in honoring reservations should not be that high
unless the reservation holder is also under some obligation to honor
his own reservation.
The court of appeals correctly held that the unforeseen plaintiff does not have standing to sue for consequential damages and
that the passenger's losses due to being bumped are too remote for
consequential damages."" It is unfortunate that a loss should occur
due to being bumped and go without compensation, but the nature
of that loss is one that must go uncompensated. Dean Prosser
reasons that the real problem in proximate cause and unforeseen
plaintiff situations is one of social policy: whether the defendant,
who has "deeper pockets" than the plaintiff, should bear the losses
incurred as a result of a highly complex, fluid civilization because
the defendant can presumably better afford such losses."'
VI. CAB's

RESPONSE TO THE NADER CONTROVERSY

Due to the confusion resulting from Nader and increasing consumer dissatisfaction with the current CAB position on overbookDOBBS, supra note 121, at S 3.2.
"I Id. See also Trammel v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 75 (W.D.N.Y.
1955) (wherein the court said that in the absence of special knowledge of special
circumstances on the part of the carrier, the plaintiff may not recover for special
damages).
19 512 F.2d 527.
0
21 PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 120, at 257. For a general discussion
concerning duty and standard of care, see Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MIcH.
L. REv. 28 (1953).
107
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ing, it is not sarprising that the Supreme Court inferred that overbooking practices might require further investigation by the CAB.""
Since the inception of Nader's litigation, the CAB has decided to
re-examine its policies concerning overbooking and is considering
a proposal to allow carriers to amend their tariffs so that notice of
overbooking would be given to the public.!"2
The CAB recently promulgated the following notices and proposed rules in the Federal Register:
1 ) The CAB announced "A Notice of Intent to Re-examine CAB
Policies Towards Deliberate Overbooking Practices." The CAB
requested the carriers file statistical reports concerning the
overbooking practices and causes of oversales. The deadline
for submission of these comments was delayed due to the complexity of compiling the requested data.2"
2) Simultaneously with the notice of intent to re-examine its policies concerning overbooking, the CAB issued a notice of proposed rule-making to determine if changes in the existing regulations are required. The CAB requested comments from both
the general public and persons who would be affected by
changes in the regulations.'"
3) The CAB requires carriers to post and distribute notices advising the public of airline overbooking of reservations. The
notice must be displayed in a conspicuous public place such as
the ticket counter. The notice must also be distributed to the
passengers. The CAB also requires the carriers to ensure that
travel agents comply with the actual notice requirement."
The CAB stated in the preamble to its proposed rule-making
201426

U.S. at 290.
CAB EDR-303, 41 Fed. Reg. 40,500 (1976).
1 CAB EDR-296, supra note 1. The date originally requested by the CAB
was on or before April 26, 1976, which was a period of less than two weeks after
the issuance of the request. Several carriers including Allegheny and TWA re202
23

quested a hearing on the subject of overbooking prior to the submission of the re-

ports. On September 14, 1976, the CAB denied TWA's motion. The CAB postponed the requirement for furnishing data until the Board could review and evaluate the public comments received. 41 Fed. Reg. 20,008 (Apr. 19, 1976).
I The CAB consolidated its Re-examination of Overbooking, EDR-296, with
the carrier's request to give notice of overbooking to the public. This action was
taken as a result of the Nader case. See 41 Fed. Reg. 40,543 (Sept. 20, 1976);
Allegheny's Comments, supra note 16; CAB EDR-296, supra note 1.
142 Fed. Reg. 12,420 (1977). See note 36 supra.
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notice that it has not undertaken any fundamental study of the
problem of overbooking since the adoption of the 1967 Boarding
Priority Rules."' Since the 1967 amendments, the Board has appeared to sanction overbooking, and the carriers' general attitude
towards overbooking has been that it was not an unfair or deceptive
trade practice." ' Since the CAB did not undertake to regulate overbooking itself and only provided a remedy for bumped reservation
holders, it has created a regulatory gap in its coverage of carriers'
activities.
The reason for the regulatory gap in overbooking relates to the
nature of the overbooking dilemma itself: can a flexible, noncommittal reservations system be maintained without no-shows?
It therefore appears exceedingly difficult to solve the dilemma due
to the definition of the problem. An additional reason for the
regulatory gap is the two policy alternatives that the CAB has to
choose between:
1) Overbooking should be eliminated by enforcing a rigid reservations system which would destroy the current flexibility in
making reservations by imposing a fine, forfeiture, or subsidy
on the no-shows; or
2) Overbooking should be condoned as the only method to combat
the no-show problem created by a flexible reservations system.
By condoning overbooking, the only regulations possible would
be to provide compensation to bumped passengers and place
controls on overbooking to prevent abuses of the practice and
mitigate its consequences.0 8
As mentioned earlier, the CAB had been unsuccessful in its prior
attempts to solve the dilemma; the Board has therefore adopted
the latter policy alternative in order to preserve reservations flex20
ibility. 9
Carriers have requested the CAB to regulate overbooking and
to allow the carriers to amend their tariffs so that the consumer
may be advised of the overbooking practices..2 " The CAB has re200CAB EDR-296, supra note 1; CAB EDR-109, supra note 2; 14 C.F.R.
250 (1967); CAB ERPI, supra note 2.
207 CAB EDR-296, supra note 1.
200 Id.
200 ld; Brief for the ATA, supra note 2.
"10See Delta's Comments, supra note 8; see note 92 supra for a reference to
the requests. See note 36 supra.
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jected the requests because a mere tariff change would amount to
constructive notice of the practice, possibly foreclosing the commonlaw cause of action based on fraudulent misrepresentation." The
CAB has, therefore, decided to consider the requests to amend the
tariff jointly with the proposed rule-making inquiring into the need
for changes in the current overbooking regulations. 1 " The CAB
has suggested, in a notice of proposed rule-making, that the carriers could amend the tariff to give notice of overbooking only if
actual notice could be given to the consumers.'13 The actual notice
proposed by the CAB would consist of conspicuously displayed
signs and individual distribution of printed notices on a separate
piece of paper delivered with the ticket."" Such a procedure would
discharge the legal limitations for which the carriers are liable."'
The proposal would not prohibit carriers from providing additional explanatory information in conjunction with the required
notices, such as a statistical table recording the frequency of bumped
passengers. ' The proposal considers a requirement that the carrier's agents give verbal notice of the overbooking practice when
a person makes reservations by phone. CAB's initial response,
however, has been that the confusion caused by such a verbal notice
would outweigh its possible benefits." '
The CAB's proposal as implemented will not solve the problems
associated with overbooking, such as no-shows. The proposal and
subsequent rule, along with previous CAB attempts, only address
remedies available after the problem has surfaced. The rule is seriously defective because persons making telephone reservations will
not receive notice of overbooking until after they have made their
reservations and anticipate boarding."' Notice at that time will
cause consumer apprehension. If actual notice is required at the
time of making the reservation, the apprehension will be perpetu311

See note 92 supra.

212Id.
31.41 Fed. Reg. at

40,501. See note 92 supra. The proposed rule became effective April 3,1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 12,420 (1977).
314 Id.
'"'See 14 C.F.R. § 221.174-176 (1975).
"..See 41 Fed. Reg. at 40,501; see note 92 supra.
"Id. The rule as adopted does not require verbal notice, only the posting

and distribution of the notice. 42 Fed. Reg. 12,420 (1977).
21,
Id.
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ated until the passenger boards the plane and will cause the passenger to multiple-book. The problem of no-shows due to multiple
booking of reservations will be greatly increased. It is difficult to
see why consumers should be expected to accept such a proposal,
because it could possibly destroy the common-law cause of action
based on misrepresentation yet allow the consumer to continue to
be overbooked. The carriers would therefore have a license to
overbook and could abuse that privilege without incurring any
penalties except the payment of denied boarding compensation,
which is slightly more than a refund of the price of the flight.
The proposal promulgated by the CAB also has another serious
deficiency. Carriers would not be required to amend their tariffs
and therefore would not be required to give notice of the overbooking practices."' This would lead consumers to believe that a
carrier who does not give notice of overbooking does not engage in
overbooking, since other carriers issue notice of their overbooking
practices. The cause of action based on misrepresentation, therefore, would be further litigated.
A review of the comments submitted by the carriers in response
to the CAB request for comments concerning the CAB proposal
and problems associated with overbooking illustrates the need for
a solution to the overbooking dilemma."' Allegheny Airlines stated
in it comments that the problems raised by overbooking "are
greatly exaggerated and do not warrant any changes in the current procedures. Despite the hue and cry from a handful of
attention-motivated consumer groups, there is no public alarm
over denied boardings as a result of oversales."." Allegheny further requested the CAB to refrain from stating that overbooking
is deceptive, because Allegheny feels "the incidence of oversales
is de minimus and little would be accomplished by attempting
to seek the various causes for oversales with a view toward eliminating those causes which could be identified and controlled."'"
The comments appear to mean that the CAB should not attempt
to seek a solution to a chronic problem. This view would seem to
request a perpetuation of the problem.
19Id.
"'Old. See notes 8, 16, 25 supra.
""Allegheny's Comments, supra note 16.
m Id.
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National Airlines' comments are a little more enlightening but
continue to perpetuate the problem. National recommends the setting of a permissible bumping rate based on the industry average
with any deviation from that norm warranting investigation."
Perhaps the comments submitted by Delta are representative of
the industry feeling "that there are no acceptable alternatives to
overbooking as a means of coping with the problems of no-shows
and reservations turnover."' Delta advocates maintaining the current system with the modification of giving notice to the public of
overbooking problems through carrier tariffs." Delta feels the carrier should not be required to offer guaranteed reservations if overbooking is disclosed."'
Any of the above solutions, either CAB or carrier, would ineffectually abate the problems raised by Nader. The CAB would
not have primary jurisdiction over the elements that a cause of
action would be based on---discrimination or misrepresentation.
Passengers would continue to be bumped, violations of the boarding priority rules would continue, and carriers would be subject to
more awards of punitive damages. Additionally, the public policy
reasons for denying consequential damages may erode due to the
failure to consider solutions to the overbooking dilemma. The
CAB's responses to Nader seem doomed to fail, since previous attempts to regulate the consequences but not the causes of overbooking have failed, and the CAB is still faced with the same policy
alternatives.""
VII.

HOPE FROM WITHIN PANDORA'S Box:

SOLVING THE

OVERBOOKING DILEMMA

A. Previous Attempts to Solve the Overbooking Dilemma
It seems painfully obvious that the airline industry and the CAB
have abandoned the search for any new workable solution.u" Four
22 National's Comments, supra note 25, at 2.
2' Delta's Comments, supra note 8, at 9.
"2 Id. at 17; Petition of Delta Air Lines, Inc. For Reconsideration and/or
Clarification of Orders 76-9-72 and 76-9-73, CAB Docket Nos. 29139, 29641,
29776 (Sept. 24, 1976).
22

6 Id.

at 10.

CAB EDR-109, supra note 2; EDR-296, supra note 1.
222Delta's Comments, supra note 8, implies that there is no solution to the
no-show problem; National's Comments, supra note 25, at 3, concurs by saying
227
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clear categories of solutions have emerged from the past thirty
years of unsuccessful attempts to regulate overbooking.
1) Carriers have charged a penalty for no-shows.22"
2) Carriers have required a forfeiture of part of the purchase price
for no-shows or late cancellations." °
3) Carriers have used standby or contingent fares to replace the
vacancies caused by no-shows."'
4) The previous attempts have been abandoned in favor of the
current systems of merely providing remedies to bumped passengers.0
A quick review of these approaches will illustrate the reasons for
their failure. The major stumbling blocks to the above solutions
are consumer resentment, carrier eagerness to avoid consumer dissatisfaction and consequential failure to fully enforce penalties or
forfeitures, and nonuniform application of the proposed solutions
which resulted in competitive advantages to the carriers exempt
from enforcing the solutions. ' Any workable solution to the dilemma must therefore retain the flexibility in reservations without imposing penalties or forfeitures, must be applied uniformly to all
carriers, and must circumvent the need for overbooking. More importantly, as history illustrates, any workable solution must seek
to solve the causes of bumping rather than merely provide remedies.
The first proposal was the institution of penalties. This plan
was the least liked and least successful of all the solutions, since it
destroyed the complete flexibility that consumers like about the
airline reservation system and incurred the ill will of the penalized
reservation makers.' This gave competitor airlines a distinct advantage. The plan mitigated the need to overbook, since the carrier retained the penalty to compensate for departing with an
the CAB cannot order elimination of human errors; Allegheny's Comments,
supra note 16, at 5, says the oversales problems questioned by the Nader case
are de minimus and should not require changing the present system. The carrier's assumptions are based on the CAB's history of unsuccessful attempts to
regulate overbooking or provide a better solution.
2 Brief for the ATA, supra note 2.
230 Id.
231/Id.

Id.
3
ld. Delta's Comments, supra note 8, at 9.
' Brief for the ATA, supra note 2.
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empty seat.' The first such plan emerged in 1946 and expired one
year later."o It provided a penalty of $2.50 or twenty-five percent,
whichever was greater, if the reservation was not cancelled at least
three hours before departure and was not honored by the reservation holder. 3 ' The plan did not fully compensate the carriers nor did
it solve the no-show problem. Similar plans were proposed in 1956
and 1957, both of which were also abandoned."' The latest penalty
plan was proposed in 1974. It provided for a fine up to $100 for
no-shows and was also quickly abandoned." 9
The second type of solution required a fully-paid ticket as a prerequisite to a confirmed reservation."o A total refund was allowed if
the reservation was cancelled prior to seventy-two hours preceding
departure."' No-shows were penalized twenty-five percent of the
fare. ' Another such plan, proposed by Eastern Airlines and submitted in 1960, allowed cancellation up to twenty-four hours prior
to departure.' Similar plans proposed in 1962 were also abandoned
due to consumer resentment and nonuniform application."
The third and most ingenious plan, also devised by Eastern Airlines, established a third type of ticket called "The Leisure
Class. "' The Leisure Class fare is a conditional reservation whereby the carrier offered a preferred standby status to persons who
agree to be bumped if the plane was overbooked.1 ' Eastern continued to accept first class and coach reservations. The number of
Leisure fares sold was supposed to replace some of the reservations lost due to no-shows and changes. The Leisure customer
would pay the regular coach price and be accorded a coach or
first class seat after all other passengers had boarded. If he could
not be accommodated on his desired flight, he was tendered a
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refund, and then flown to his destination free on the next available
flight."' This was not discriminatory to the first class or coach passengers since the Leisure customer undertook the risk of delay
in hopes of a free flight and therefore "assumed the risk" of being
bumped. This reduced the risk that first class and coach passengers
would be bumped.'
B. A Solution to the Dilemma
A proposed solution is now submitted to circumvent the dilemma. The proposed solution avoids the dilemma by modifying the
current system so that overbooking is limited solely to a class of
reservation holders who agree to assume the risk of being bumped
as consideration for the benefits limited to the conditional fare.
Current CAB regulations and carrier tariffs should be amended
to reflect the following:
A) Deliberate overbooking should be limited to conditional reservations.
B) A third type of conditional reservation should be imposed as
a substitute for the overbooking of first and coach reservations.
The conditional reservation would be similar to the Leisure
Class concept. The conditional reservation would be a reservation that could be made any time prior and up to departure.
The conditional fare would be the same price as coach, but the
conditional reservation holder would accept the risk of being
bumped in consideration for a refund of the ticket price and a
free flight on the next available flight. The conditional reservation holder would, therefore, receive a reservation. If space
permitted on the reserved flight, he would depart on that fRight,
but if the flight was overbooked as to the conditional reservation holders, he would then receive what he gambled for: a
free flight. The conditional passenger would be distinguished
from the standby fares in that there is no discount on the
conditional fare as exists for standby fares. The standby passenger currently has no guarantee of being accommodated. If
no vacancies appear, he is denied boarding regardless of the
time lapse between purchase of the ticket and hopeful departure. The conditional passenger does have a reservation,
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subject to being bumped, and is guaranteed a space on the next
available flight. The conditional fare may not be attractive to
persons with rigid schedules, but would be desirable for persons who can afford to miss one flight in return for a free
flight.
C) Overbooking should be imposed on the conditional class.
D) The current Capacity Management Programs and booking
curve predictions could then be applicable to the conditional
class. Present limitations and control of abuses on overbooking
would therefore be shifted to the conditional class. "'
E) All passengers must be given actual notice of the overbooking
policy at the time of making the reservation. Conditional passengers must assume the risk of being bumped as consideration
for the chance of a free flight. First class and economy passengers would be advised that they are not subject to deliberate
overbooking. However, the carrier shall not be liable for consequential losses incurred in the event that a passenger is
denied boarding due to weather conditions, errors in transmitting and receiving reservations, etc. If, for the above reason,
a first class or economy passenger is denied boarding, his compensation would be the current liquidated damages. Since there
would be no misrepresentation, due to actual notice and constructive notice in the tariff, no cause of action based on misrepresentation could lie. For all practical purposes, the CAB
remedy would become an exclusive remedy notwithstanding
the preservation of common-law remedies by the Federal
Aviation Act."*
F) If conditional passengers are overbooked, and consequentially
bumped, then the order of boarding priority shall be based on
the time at which they arrived at the ticket gate. Current
boarding priority rules would need to be amended to reflect
this order of priority, since many priority rules are currently
based on the time of making the reservation.
The proposed system would operate as follows:
Assume the plane holds twenty first class and eighty coach seats.
24 Carriers would still be required to submit CAB form 251. See 14 C.F.R.
S 250 (1975).
-0 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1970); see note 59 supra.
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Under the current system, if thirty reservation vacancies are anticipated by the booking curve, one hundred thirty reservations are
accepted. Both first class and coach passengers are subject to being
overbooked and bumped. Under the proposed solution, only twenty
first class and eighty coach reservations would be accepted; these
passengers would not be subject to being bumped. The carrier
would also accept thirty conditional reservations. If the booking
curve prediction of thirty reservation turnovers or no-shows was
correct, the plane would depart at full capacity of one hundred
passengers without any bumping. If, however, only twenty instead
of thirty reservations changed, then ten conditional reservation
holders would be bumped and given a free flight on the next available flight. It is unlikely that all twenty first class and sixty coach
passengers would show up or that the booking curve grossly overestimated the number of reservation changes. If the unlikely event
were to occur, however, the proposed solution would benefit the
consumer by preventing unsuspecting first class or coach passengers
from being bumped and subjecting the carrier to common-law or
statutory liability under the discrimination claim if the boarding
priority rules were broken. The current system would subject the
carrier to punitive damages, since it is foreseeable that the carrier
would breach his boarding priority rules. "1 The proposal circumvents that possibility. The current system would also require payment of denied boarding compensation if common-law claims were
not pursued, while the proposal allows the carrier to delay the
payment by giving the conditional passenger a seat on a later flight
which might have departed with vacant seats anyway."' The maximum liability the carrier would face under the proposal would be
the payment of denied boarding compensation to conditional passengers who decide not to wait for a free flight. This is certainly
more economical than being subject to punitive damages.
It is also unlikely, under the proposed solution, that the carrier
could be subject to punitive damages under any theory of discrimination, since the boarding priority rules would require conditional
2'1

Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Tex. 1976).

" The definition of next available flight could be defined as the next flight
after the conditional passenger was bumped or the next flight wherein empty

seats are available. The latter definition would approximate the current standby
fare while the first definition would be more novel, more attractive to the consummer, and would also aid the proposal's success from a marketing standpoint.
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passengers to be boarded after the first class and coach passengers.
The bumping order for the conditional passengers would therefore be such that the carrier would not have to delay a flight in
order to follow its boarding priority rules. A carrier could not be
liable to a bumped passenger based on the discrimination claim
unless he violated the boarding priority rule. Therefore, no cause
of action could be asserted.

C.

THE PROPOSED SOLUTION SHOULD BE ADOPTED SINCE

IT

BOTH PRESERVES THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE CURRENT
SYSTEM AND AvoIDS THE CONSEQUENCES OF Nader.

The proposed solution does not solve the no-show problem but
circumvents the overbooking dilemma, since the basis for the
common-law and statutory claims, such as misrepresentation and
discrimination, are precluded from arising. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction would take overbooking out of the uncertain tort
realm and place it in the contract arena, since the tariff incorporation and CAB regulation would give the CAB subject matter
jurisdiction over both overbooking and its remedies.' The issues
of misrepresentation and discrimination, which are not subject to
primary jurisdiction, would no longer be relevant. The no-show
problem itself would be mitigated under the proposed solution since
one of its major causes, multiple reservations, would be reduced.
There would no longer be any incentive to multiple-book in order
to insure against being bumped. Of course, passengers with uncertain schedules will probably continue to make multiple reservations on successive flights, since the time of their departure is not
certain. The proposed solution, however, can easily cope with this
problem and still preserve the flexibility that allows consumers to
continue multiple-booking for the sake of convenience.
The spectre of the unforeseen plaintiff and damages for losses
incurred as a result of being bumped would also be abrogated by
the proposal. The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale would bar consequential damages because the parties did not contemplate the loss
caused by bumping. ' Additionally, the reservation holders have
assumed the risk of being bumped.
' See Mortimer v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
2' Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
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An assumption that most consumers would choose conditional
fares instead of the first class or coach fares would pose no problem, since the ultimate number of reservations to accept would depend on the booking curve. If the booking curve is accurate, then
only that number of reservations would be accepted. If all reservations accepted were conditional reservations, those passengers
would be obligated to accept that flight or a refund of the ticket
price, since they have not yet been bumped. It would, therefore,
be extremely difficult for consumers to take advantage of the
proposed solution and unprofitable for carriers to abuse the system,
since deliberate overselling of conditional fares would require giving
free flights. Presumably, deliberate overbooking of first class and
coach reservations would amount to a fraudulent misrepresentation. Therefore, there is no incentive for the carrier to abuse the
proposal.
The proposal differs from Eastern's "Leisure Class" in that:
1) The Leisure Class Concept is only being used by Eastern and
is not widely publicized nor uniformly applied, while the proposal would be widely publicized and uniformly applied.
2) Eastern uses the Leisure Class in addition to overbooking.
Overbooking, while offering the conditional fare, defeats the
purpose of having the Leisure Class and precludes its maximum efficiency, since the overbooked passengers are boarded
prior to the conditional passengers. On the other hand, the
proposal would disallow overbooking and substitute the new
conditional class in its place. As reservations turned over, the
conditional reservation holders would be guaranteed confirmed
reservations as openings occurred. If ten reservation holders
cancelled prior to departure, the first ten conditional reservation holders would automatically step into confirmed reservations.
CONCLUSION

Overbooking has plagued the airline industry and the consumer
since 1947. The Supreme Court has indicated that maintaining
the status quo may no longer be possible."' Any other proposal
that does not seek to solve or circumvent the dilemma will prob21

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
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ably not be successful."' The proposed solution incorporates the
desired aspects of the prior plans, without their liabilities, and
should be desirable both to the consumer and the carrier." '
It appears safe to assume that most consumers would prefer the
proposal over the current system, since the consumer would be
aware of his chances of boarding. He would know his chances of
boarding at the time he made the reservation as opposed to the
current system which abruptly bumps the reservation holder at the
time of departure. It is argued that a business man would not
choose a conditional reservation since he needs a guaranteed reservation. No such guarantee exists under the current system, and the
reservation holder is under a false impression when he assumes his
seat is guaranteed merely because he made the reservation or confirmed the reservation. Under the proposal, he could obtain a guaranteed reservation simply by booking early before the plane reached
its capacity. If he booked late, he would be notified of his chances of
securing a seat. The consumer could then plan his schedule accordingly. Most consumers would obviously prefer the chance to
arrange their schedule to cope with the possible delay to being
bumped unexpectedly and having their plans jeopardized. It is
time to seal Pandora's Box, and the proposed solution is submitted
as a viable alternative to nail the lid shut.

'
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CAB EDR-296, supra note 1.

TThe proposed plan should be enforceable and appease rather than anger
consumers. See CAB ERPI, supra note 2, for a discussion of prior plans' faults.

